高管任期、盈余质量与真实盈余管理

Executive Tenure and Real Earnings Management

从高管个人特征的微观角度分析企业真实盈余管理的影响因素。通过选取2008年至2012年沪深两市A股企业,实证研究发现CEO和CFO任期与企业真实盈余管理程度存在U型的曲线关系。同时研究也发现,高管任期与真实盈余管理程度的U型关系,在非国有企业、两职分开的企业以及管理层持股的公司和业绩较差的公司更显著。本文的研究结果表明,高管任期是企业真实盈余管理的重要影响因素。

This study examines the association between executive tenure （CEO and CFO） and real earnings management activities in firms. Using public firms from 2008 to 2012, it finds that the relation between CEO and CFO tenure and real earnings management is U shape. In addition, it documents that the U shape is more pronounced at Nun-State-Owned-Enterprises （NONSOE） firms, firms that CEOs are not acting as the Chairman, firms that do not award management with stocks and firms with poor performance.