科斯对法律与经济关系的最终认识及其缺憾——基于中国案例的分析

On Coase's Final Idea about the Relation between Law &Economy and His Disadvantages:A Case Study in China

科斯早期关于交易成本和"法律功能论"的思想对经济学界产生了深刻的影响,而其后期关于"法律生成论"的思想却尚未得到学术界应有的重视。文章通过梳理科斯关于法经济学思想的前后变化,以中国农村的家庭联产承包责任制为案例说明科斯后期思想的转向。研究发现:(1)科斯对法律与经济关系的认识经历了早期的"法律功能论"到后期的"法律生成论"的转变,两者形成互补关系;(2)制度变迁成本的降低是"边缘改革"启动的关键前提,而基层经济力量的积累又推动了"亲市场"法律体系的生成;(3)科斯的"法律生成论"的逻辑并不完善,中国的改革实践表明,既得利益的松动和思想观念的改变以及上层政治权力的支持是制度变迁成本降低的必要条件。因此,在理想情境下,转型期的法律应该主动与来自基层的制度演化相调试,从而形成更为"亲市场"法律体系。

The early thought of Coase about transaction costs and law＇s function has the profound effect on the economics field,but his later thought about law＇s evolution has not yet attracted enough attention from scholars.Through a review of the differences between early and later thought of Coase in the field of law and economics,this paper explains Coase＇s later thought about law＇s evolution in a case of household contract responsibility system of rural China.It arrives at the following conclusions：firstly,Coase＇s idea about the relationship between law and economy has changed from early thought about law＇s function to later thought about law＇s evolution,which are complementary;secondly,the decline in institutional evolution costs is the key premise of beginning marginal revolution,and the accumulation of economic power of grassroots also promotes the generation of pro-market law system;thirdly,there are disadvantages in Coase＇s logics of law＇s evolution,and the reform experiences in China show that loosening constraints on vested interest and ideology,and the supports from supreme political power are necessary conditions for the decline in institutional evolution costs.Therefore,in an ideal context,law in the transition period should be active to coordinate with institutional evolution from grassroots,thereby leading to more pro-market law system.