摘要
历史主义者通常认为,历史处理个体而科学关注普遍事物。但在今天,很少有哲学家会赞同历史主义者在历史与科学之间划出的界线。公认的批评是,只有诉诸普遍事物,才能表达关于个体的知识。本文尝试通过对个体概念的分析来复原历史主义者的论点,这一分析较之传统的历史主义者在论述历史书写的性质时所给出的分析更接近原义也更为准确。在本文中,莱布尼茨的实体或单子概念被证明是十分有用的。
It has often been argued, especially by historicists, that history deals with the individual where science fo-cuses on the universal. But few philosophers would nowadays express their agreement with the historicist 's demarcation between history and the sciences. A standard criticism is that the knowledge of individuals can only be expressed by an appeal to universals. This essay is an effort to rehabilitate the historicist argument by means of a closer and more accurate analysis of the notion of individuals than is given in the traditional historicist ac-count of the nature of historical writing. Leibniz's conception of the substance or the monad proves to be quite helpful here.
出处
《学术研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第6期91-105,160,共15页
Academic Research
