中国高科技企业信贷融资的信号博弈分析

Signaling Games for High-tech Enterprises Bank Lending

高科技企业与银行间的信息不对称程度较高,普遍面临着信贷约束,这一问题在中国市场弱有效性且信用体系不健全的环境中更为突出。具有公信力的政府作为独立的第三方,对高科技企业的支持行为具有认证效应,企业传递获得政府支持的相关信息有利于提高银行的认知和认可水平,对缓解信贷约束能起到积极作用。本文建立符合中国环境的不完全信息动态博弈模型,识别并验证了政府支持行为作为具有认证效应的信号,在缓解高科技企业信贷约束问题上的可行性和有效性。本文发现,所有高科技企业都有动机传递信号,而且有可能传递虚假信号来粉饰企业质量。

High-tech enterprises always have trouble on bank lending, due to asymmetric information, which is more severe in transition economic conditions like China. There is some market failure though the market mechanism plays a decisive role on rationing credit resource. Meanwhile, supporting behaviors to high-teeh enterprises, act by the government who is an independent third party in the market, may have a certification effect. The supporting behaviors could be a signal to relieve information asymmetry and make high-tech enterprises more credible. We identify and verify whether the government＇s supporting behaviors could play as a signal in high-tech enterprises＇ bank lending process by combining methods of theoretical deduction and mathematical analysis, based on a dynamic games of incomplete information model. We find that all of the high-tech enterprises have motivations to signal to banks and some of them even transmit mendacious signals to pretend a higher quality of enterprises. Our findings could provide a new way to relieve the information asymmetry in credit market, help banks to manage credit risk effectively and provide a theoretical reference for the government to highlight the influence of policies.