基于企业生命周期的高管激励契约最优动态配置——价值分配的视角

THE OPTIMAL DYNAMIC COLLOCATION OF SENIOR EXECUTIVES' INCENTIVE CONTRACTS——An Empirical Study Based on Enterprise Lifecycle Theory

本文基于生命周期和委托代理理论,在价值分配视角下,阐释了生命周期演进过程中高管效用敏感性变化规律以及不同高管激励机制运行特征,构建了高管激励契约最优动态配置方案,并利用中国高科技上市公司2010—2013年的面板数据,对高管激励契约体系对企业价值分配的影响进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,在企业成长期和蜕变期,高管薪酬激励能够有效抑制代理成本;而高管声誉激励机制仅在企业成熟期表现出对代理成本的抑制效应;生命周期各阶段内,控制权激励均未发挥显著的治理作用,相反在蜕变期,控制权沦为高管挖掘私人利益的工具。因此,改善薪酬激励期限结构,提升声誉激励和高管市场约束的持续性,构建高管控制权管理制度体系是实现高管激励契约最优动态配置的必经之路。

Executives＇ incentive effect mostly depends on collocation status of the whole incentive con- tracts system. The optimal collocation of incentive contracts must follow the enterprises＇ lifecycle process- ing rule, which is guided by executives＇ sensitivity towards their own utility of both monetary and non-mo- netary forms. Based on lifecycle theory and principle-agent theory, this paper explains the change regula- tion of executives＇ utility and the features of three incentive mechanisms, based on which the optimal dy- namic collocation of incentive contracts. By using Chinese high-tech listed corporations＇ panel data as re- search sample, the impacts upon agency cost from incentive contracts have been tested. Empirical results show that, during both growing and decaying periods, compensation incentive contract can restrain agency costs significantly. Meanwhile executive＇ reputation incentive mechanism has the same influence towards agency costs while corporations in mature stage. However, the governance effect from control right incen- tive is not significant. On the contrary, it boosts agency cost during the corporations＇ decaying period. Ac- cordingly, in order to realize the optimal incentive effect, the term structure of compensation incentive should be optimized, and constancy of reputation incentive should be extended. Meanwhile, setting up ef- ficient control rights management system is also essential to promote executives＇ incentive effect.