媒体关注、分析师跟进与业绩预告违规

Media Attention, Analysts Coverage, and Irregularities in Management Earnings Forecasts

本文考察了媒体关注对上市公司业绩预告违规行为的影响,研究发现,媒体关注通过降低上市公司业绩预告违规概率发挥治理作用。在分析师跟进较多的公司中,其治理作用更为显著,这说明媒体与分析师对业绩预告违规的治理作用能够互为补充,有效降低"坏消息"业绩预告的违规概率,强化监管制度对业绩预告行为的约束。在控制了可能的内生性问题后,该结论依然稳健。本文的研究丰富了媒体治理与业绩预告相关文献,为监管部门信息披露制度的制定与执行提供了新的经验证据。

This paper investigate the impact of media attention on Chinese listed firms’ management earnings forecasts. The empirical results indicate that media attention can reduce the irregularities of mandatory management earnings forecasts significantly. The effect is more pronounced for firms with better analysts coverage. This finding implies that the monitoring roles played by media attention and analysts coverage can complement each other in terms of correcting management earnings forecasts. After controlling the endogeneity, the result is still robust. This paper sheds new light on research areas involving media attention and management earnings forecasts, serving as new empirical reference for the establishment and enforcement of information disclosure rules.