基于委托—代理博弈的物流金融合约选择研究

Study on the Selection of Logistics Financial Contracts Based on the Principal-agent Game

文章主要探讨了物流金融中,银行与第三方物流企业之间存在的信用风险问题,通过双方进行委托—代理博弈,银行找到了最优的佣金合同来保证3PL合作的同时自身的期望收益也最高。通过博弈分析发现,银行更倾向于与愿意承担更大风险的优质3PL合作,同时也愿意支付额外的奖金来更大程度的促进项目的成功。

This paper mainly discusses credit risk problem between the bank and the 3PL in the logistics finance by principal-a- gent game. Banks find the optimal commission contract to ensure that 3PL cooperation and their expected return is the highest. Through the game analysis found that banks tend to cooperation with the premium 3PL who willing take on more risk. Banks also tend to pay extra money to a greater degree to promote the success of the project.