权力强度、内部控制与大股东掏空行为抑制

Power Strength, Internal Control and Inhibition of Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders

利用2009~2013年间我国上市公司和大股东之间的资金占用、关联担保、关联销售和合资合营四类关联交易事项数据,回答三个问题：何种类型的关联交易是大股东掏空首选？内部控制对大股东的权力强度有无影响？内部控制能否抑制大股东掏空行为？研究发现：关联担保仍是大股东偏爱的传统掏空方式,资金占用方式中的非经营性资金占用呈现出功能弱化现象;大股东通过资金占用和关联担保掏空时,内部控制明显发挥对大股东权力强度和掏空行为的抑制效应。

Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2013, this paper uses four types of related party transactions includ- ing capital occupancg, related assurance, related sales, joint ventures to address three questions： which types of connected transactions is the preferred tunneling mode of the blockholder？ Does the internal control have no effect on the power intensity of the blockholder？ Can the in- ternal control restrain the tunneling behavior of blockholder？ We find limited evidence that firms is still undertaking related assurance as their optimal choice of expropriation, related cash payments is decreasing; When the blockholder apply the ways of capital occupaneg and related assurance to expropriate the minority shareholders, internal control can play a power-controlling role. At the same time, internal control can obviously mitigate the degree of tunneling.