智能电网通信干扰攻击的动态博弈策略

Dynamic game strategy for jamming attack in smart grid communications

为研究智能电网通信干扰攻击与防御行为的相互作用,本文根据攻防双方能力有限性和攻防行为多阶段性等特点,使用动态博弈理论中的多阶段的双人零和博弈来描述攻防过程。理论分析与实验仿真表明:通过在每个阶段选择最优策略,攻击者和防御者都可以最大程度维护自身利益,从而达到整个动态博弈的纳什均衡解。

This paper analyzes the cyber attack and defense process in smart grid communications. Regarding the limited ability of action and the multi-stage characteristic of attack/defense, a multi-stage two-person zero-sum game model of dynamic game theo- ry is adopted to describe the attack and defense process. The theoretical analyses and simulation results demonstrate that by choo- sing the optimal strategies in each stage the attacker and defender can both maximize their benefits and an overall Nash equilibrium will be achieved.