“中国模式”下的地方政府行为——地方保护的产生和应对

Local Government Act under "China Model" ——Local Protection Response and Generation

对地方保护主义既有的研究将其产生的原因局限在地方政府的财政激励和政绩激励上,忽视了发展环境和模式对地方政府行为的影响。在"中国模式"的发展思路下,发展型地方政府以地方经济发展为己任,追求更高的财政收益,驱动着地方政府保护本地产业。"地方政府——属地企业"统合发展模式下形成的新型政企关系,为地方保护提供了载体和实施手段。区域竞争中形成的"囚徒困境"使地方保护政策在一定程度上成为地方政府的无奈之举。随着中国市场机制的逐渐完善,地方保护所反映的政府对经济的过度干预弊端丛生,因此需要借鉴其他东亚国家的经验,对"中国模式"进行反思,重新定位政府的职责。同时,通过司法领域的改革、建立一套国内贸易审查机制,也有利于限制地方保护行为。

Existing studies of local protectionism confine its causes to financial incentives and performance incentives of local government,ignoring the impact of development environment and model on the behavior of local government. Under the 'China model ',developmental local government takes local economic development as its responsibility,and the pursuit of higher financial revenue drives local government to protect local industries. The new relationship between the government and enterprise,which is formed in the model of'Local government — local enterprise',provides carriers and implementation means for local protection. To some extent,the 'Prisoner's Dilemma'forming in regional competition forces local government to take local protection policies. With the gradual improvement of China's market mechanisms,excessive government intervention in the economy,such as local protection,has produced numerous drawbacks. Therefore,we need to draw experience from other East Asian countries,to review the'China model'and redefine the role of government. Meanwhile,judicial reform and domestic trade review mechanism are both favorable to limit local protection behavior.