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不完全不确定序数信息下的双边匹配决策 被引量:2

Two-sided Matching Decision with Incomplete and Uncertain Ordinal Information
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摘要 针对不完全不确定序数信息下的双边匹配问题,提出了一种新方法。首先,描述了不完全不确定序数信息下的双边匹配问题;接着,将不完全不确定序数矩阵转化为不完全满意度矩阵;其次,以每方主体满意度总和最大为目标,考虑到一对一匹配约束条件,构建了匹配模型;运用线性加权法将双目标匹配模型进行转化,进而通过求解转化后的单目标优化模型获得匹配方案。实例分析说明了所提方法的可行性和有效性。 With respect to the two-sided matching problem with incomplete and uncertain ordinal information, this paper presents a novel method. Firstly, the two-sided matching problem with incomplete and uncertain ordinal information is described. Then, incomplete and uncertain ordinal matrixes are changed into incomplete satisfaction degree matrixes. To maximize the sum of satisfaction degrees of agents on each side, a matching model considering constraint conditions of one-to-one matching is set up. The linear weighted method is used to transform the bi-objeetive matching model. By solving the transformed single-objective optimization model, the matching alternative can be obtained. An example analysis illustrates the feasibility and validity of the proposed method.
出处 《模糊系统与数学》 CSCD 北大核心 2015年第2期118-124,共7页 Fuzzy Systems and Mathematics
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71261007 71261006 71361021)
关键词 双边匹配 不完全不确定序数 优化模型 Two-sided Matching l Incomplete and Uncertain Ordinal~ Optimization Model
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参考文献19

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二级参考文献140

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