国企高管腐败：激励失效还是约束缺失？--基于“古井腐败窝案”的分析

Executives of State-owned Enterprises Corruption, Incentive Failure or Constraint Missing?——Analysis Based on The“Gujing Scandal”

近年来,国企高管腐败案件频发,呈现出从个体腐败向群体腐败转变的新趋势,造成了国民经济的巨大损失。本文以2007-2009年被广泛报导的安徽古井集团腐败窝案为例,从制度的角度剖析了国企高管腐败的诱因。分析发现,国企高管腐败内生于制度的天然缺陷。制度缺陷引起的激励失效与约束缺失相互影响,最终导致了国企高管腐败行为的发生。因此,公开透明的内部信息披露制度是完善内部监督机制的有效措施;强化法律约束、政府的严密监管以及全面的媒体监督是加强外部监督的重要举措;积极推进市场化改革,建立职业经理人市场是减少国企高管腐败动机的必要手段;破除企业集权式文化对于预防腐败的发生至关重要。

In recent years, there are more and more state executive corruptions, which emerged from a single change to the new trend of corruption groups. It caused huge economic losses. This paper adopts the case ＂Gujing Scandal＂ which was widely reported in 2007-2009, and explores the motivation of the state executive corruption from the perspective of institution. It found that state exccutive corruption is due to defects in the natural institution, which is the combined result of incentive failure and lacking of restraint. Then this paper put forward reasonable proposals for China＇s stateowned enterprise about bow to prevent corruption. First of all, open and transparent information disclosure system is an effective measure to improve internal oversight mechanisms. Then in order to strengthen the constraint and improve supervision, strengthening the legal constraints, strict government regulation and comprehensive news media supervision are of great help. What＇ s more, promoting actively the market-oriented reforms and establishing a professional manager market is also necessary means to reduce corruption motives of SOE executives. Furthermore, getting rid of cena＇alized culture is an effective measure as well.