高校债务预算软约束原因探析——基于三方不完全信息动态博弈模型的研究

The Discussion of the Reason for College' s Debt Soft Budget Constraint Behavior——Research on Dynamic Game Model of Three-party Incomplete Information

本文从构建政府、高校、银行三方不完全信息动态博弈模型出发,分析不同条件下的博弈均衡,将高校和银行最优博弈策略的条件加以量化,从而找到高校债务预算软约束现象出现的经济学原因。本文研究发现,高校和银行的最优博弈策略的选择一方面取决于他们对政府类型的先验和后验概率,另一方面取决于他们的预期成本与收益,因此政府若要遏制高校债务预算软约束现象,必须从管理高校和银行的预期,调整他们的成本与收益函数等方面着手。

This paper establishes a three - party dynamic game model of incomplete information for the govern- ment, colleges and banks, analyzes the game balance under different conditions, and finds out the economic reason for colleges＇ debt soft budget constraint behavior. We find out that the best strategies of the college and bank depend on their priori and posterior probability of government＇s style, and their expected cost and profit. Therefore, to con- tain the colleges＇ soft budget constraint behavior, government must manage the expectation of colleges and banks, and change their cost and profit function.