金融可得性、融资成本与法律实施

Financial Availability,Financing Cost and Legal Implementation

转型中国常被作为缺乏法律有效支持的情况下取得巨大经济成功的例子,也被作为"法律的有效实施有助于企业更好地获得融资"这个命题的例外。原因有二:一是中国的经济成功主要是那些非正规部门推动的,这些部门的企业却主要依赖于长期关系、声誉维持的非正规融资;二是许多更有效率的民营企业的融资来自国企的金融资源漏损,这种漏损是非法的。如果长期关系和声誉、甚至非法漏损在融资中扮演重要角色,法律的作用要么不显著,要么为负。本文利用微观的企业融资数据重新审视这个问题后发现,全部的企业样本证明法律有利于企业融资,局部的融资困难的民营企业样本,甚至参与腐败的企业样本同样支持法律的有效性命题;我们以信任作为长期关系的代理变量,考察了正式的法律制度、非正式的长期关系及其交互作用,发现法律与长期关系中的信任是互补而不是替代关系,都有利于企业融资;民营企业、金融可得性差的企业更容易参与金融腐败,外资企业更不容易参与金融腐败。

China in transition is always thought an exception that law- enforcement helps financing of firms. Two reasons are proposed. First of all, many Chinese firms depend on informal financing which enforcement mechanism is long term relationship and reputation. Second, many more efficient private firms get their financial resource from stated owned enterprises illegally, which are called leakage effect. If these points are right, the role of law for firm financing must be trivial or negative in China. This paper reexamines this question with micro data of fiims. Our conclusion is law- enforcement helps firms＇ financing for overall sample, private firms, and even those which participated in financial corruption.