工程项目质量的团队激励机制研究

Group Incentive Mechanism of Construction Quality

针对多个承包商的工程质量团队激励机制设计问题,根据工程质量管理的特点,利用委托-代理理论,采用线性激励契约,建立工程项目质量的团队激励模型。结合算例,运用粒子群算法求解不同分部分项工程质量评价权重和承包商风险态度组合下的团队激励模型,得到其最优均衡解。结果表明,承包商风险态度相同时,质量评价权重越大,业主应给予的激励强度就越大,承包商为实现自身利润最大化,其努力达到的工程质量水平也越高;选择风险中性的承包商比选择风险厌恶的承包商更有利于实现业主效用的最大化。

How to motivate the contractor team effectively in order to improve the utility level of the owner has important practical significance. This paper focuses on the design of group incentive mechanism of construction quality between the owner and multiple contractors. According to the characteristics of the construction quality management,group incentive model of construction quality is developed with linear incentive contract by using the theory of principal- agent. Illustrated by a numerical example,PSO algorithm is proposed to solve the equilibrium solution of group incentive model under combinations of different construction evaluation weights and risk aversion parameters. The results show that when the contractors＇ risk aversion parameters of contractors are the same,the owner should give greater quality incentive strength to the contractor that undertakes the project with larger quality evaluation weight; in order to maximize their profit,the contractors should make efforts to achieve higher construction quality level. Choosing risk neutral contractors is more conducive to maximize the owner＇s utility rather than risk aversion contractors.