内部资本市场运行、资本投资与资本配置行为——基于“系族企业”的分析

Internal capital market operation,capital investment and capital allocation behavior——Based on the analysis of the faction enterprise

内部资本市场资本配置功能的发挥有赖于其资本配置效率的高低,而内部资本市场资本配置效率又受其资本配置行为的影响。以"系族企业"为研究对象,以"投资不足"和"过度投资"为分组条件,运用投资现金流敏感性模型分析"系族企业"内部资本市场资本配置行为。研究结果发现:在"投资不足"组,"系族企业"总体上实现了有效的资本跨企业补贴;国有"系族企业"能够利用内部资本市场实现其资本配置功能,但是民营"系族企业"却不能有效发挥其资本配置功能,内部资本市场更可能异化为掏空工具;在"过度投资"组,"系族企业"并没有通过跨部门的交叉补贴来扩大过度投资问题,内部资本市场的资本配置功能没有异化为掏空的工具;国有"系族企业"并没有进行无效的企业内部交叉补贴,民营"系族企业"却可以通过内部资本市场的资本转移来实现其资本的有效配置。

Capital allocation function of internal capital markets plays a role that depends on the discretion of the capital allocation efficiency. At the same time,internal capital market capital allocation efficiency is affected by its capital allocation behavior. According to this line of thinking,with ＂faction enterprise＂as the research object,with ＂underinvestment＂and ＂excessive investment ＂as the grouping condition,the paper uses investment cash flow sensitivity of the model analyzed internal capital market capital allocation behavior in ＂faction enterprise＂. In the underinvestment group,the paperfound through the empirical study that ＂faction enterprise＂implements the effective subsidy of capital across the enterprise,＂state faction enterprise＂can use the capital allocation of internal capital market to achieve its function,but＂private faction enterprise＂cannot effectively play its capital allocation function. Internal capital market is more likely alienation for the empty tool. In the excessive investment group,＂faction enterprise ＂doesn ＇t amplify the excessive investment through Cross- subsidy across departments,capital allocation function of internal capital markets doesn＇t alienation for emptying the tools; ＂state faction enterprise＂didn＇t make invalid internal cross subsidy,at the same time＂private faction enterprise＂can achieve the capital allocation efficient through internal capital markets of capital transfer.