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论双层股权结构的可行性和法律边界 被引量:25

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摘要 双层股权结构因其良好地解决了公司上市融资的需求和创始人团队控制权旁落之间的矛盾,合理地分散了内部股东的投资风险,并且作为有效的抵御恶意收购的方式,早在一百年前就受到西方国家一些公司的青睐。但是双层股权结构自其诞生之日起就伴随着质疑之声,特别是其引起的代理成本问题和监督机制问题,对公司民主原则提出了挑战。而我国由于坚守"同股同权"的原则,一直未对双层股权结构给予肯定的态度。在我国众多公司利用监管套利而纷纷走向外国股票市场上市的大环境下,应当对双层股权结构持宽容的态度,并根据双层股权结构在西方存在百年的实践经验和实证研究,再结合我国的现实情况,从法律层面为双层股权结构的存在破除障碍。
作者 金晓文
机构地区 北京大学法学院
出处 《法律适用》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第7期53-59,共7页 Journal of Law Application
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参考文献40

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二级参考文献83

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