管理层持股、自由现金流与企业过度投资行为研究

Research on Management Shareholding, Free Cash Flow and Enterprise Excessive Investment

在现代企业制度下,通过管理层持股将股东与管理层之间的堑壕效应转化为利益协同效应,能有效减少管理层的过度投资行为。通过实证研究发现,管理层持股与企业过度投资—自由现金流存在二次曲线关系,过度投资对自由现金流的敏感性与管理层持股呈正U型关系。当管理层持股达到一定比例时,企业过度投资对自由现金流敏感度最低,对企业抑制过度投资的作用最大。

Under the modem enterprise system, management shareholding can transform the entrenchment effect between shareholders and managers into convergence interest effect, and reduce the excessive investment behavior of managers. Empirical research shows that there is conical relationship between management shareholding and enterprise excessive investment-free cash flow. There is a positive u-shaped relationship sensitivity between the excessive investment of free cash flow and management shareholding. When the management shareholding reaches a certain proportion, enterprise excessive investment has minimum sensitivity to free cash flow, so it has the maximum effect to restrain excessive investment at this point.