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地方政府绩效评估中博弈行为的致因研究--分析框架及其初步检视 被引量:12

Exploring the Driving Forces of Gaming in Government Performance Evaluation in China:Findings from A Public Survey
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摘要 绩效评估中的信息失真是一个普遍存在的现象,博弈行为及其致因一直是绩效评估中的重要主题。借鉴国际文献并立足中国国情,本文构建了一个博弈致因分析框架,包括社会规范、任务难度、考评体系认同度、监督力度、激励机制等五个一级因素和16个二级因素。初步问卷调查表明,84%被访者认为信息失真现象非常普遍或比较普遍,公民满意度和生态环境数据中的信息失真问题最为突出。在五大博弈致因中,社会规范和监督力度被视为导致博弈行为的主要因素。二级因素分析发现一些与国内外主流看法的不同并对这些差异进行解释。针对具体存在的问题提出了相关对策。 The inaccuracy of performance information for government has long been a problem perfovmance evalnation. Based on the literature with special attention to the Chinese context, we proposed an analytical framework to explore the driving forces for sucl inaccura- cy, including five headline factors such as social norms and task difficulty, and a total of 16 sub-factors. A primary test of the model through a questionnaire survey of 257 MPA students found that data inaccuracy was a serious problem and data on citizen satisfaction and environ- ment quality were among the worst. Of the five main factors, social norms and weak external supervision were the primary causes of cheat- ing. Some differences with the literature were found concerning the sub-factors and we provide some explanations.
机构地区 海南大学 北京大学
出处 《上海行政学院学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第4期14-23,共10页 The Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute
基金 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“中国地方政府绩效评价体系与管理机制研究”(05JZDH0019) 国家社科基金重大招标课题“地方服务型政府建构路径与对策”(09&ZD063)阶段性成果 北京大学“国家治理协同创新中心”成果
关键词 绩效评估 博弈行为 博弈致因 问卷调查 Performance Evaluation Gaming Behavior Causes of Gaming Survey
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参考文献12

  • 1Bohte, John and Kenneth J. Meier (2000), Goal Displacement: Assessing the Motivation for Organizational Cheating, Public Admin- istration Review, March/April 2000, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 173-182.
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