竞争环境下采油厂油藏投资激励机制设计研究

A Study on Incentive Mechanism Design in Reservoir Management Investment Based on Competitive Environment

随着油藏经营管理在国内油田企业的逐步完善,业内学者对油藏经营管理的评价、投资和管理成本进行了研究,但都存在不足之处:忽视了油田企业内部组织结构和关系对油藏经营管理的影响,未涉及采油厂和油藏经营管理区之间的激励机制问题。本文在构建由单个采油厂和两个油藏经营管理区组成的委托代理模型基础上,研究了油藏经营管理区之间的竞争关系对采油厂投资信息价值和代理成本的影响,探讨了油藏经营管理区之间可能的合谋行为和采油厂的防范措施对投资激励机制的影响。研究结论表明:采油厂应该努力去收集与石油项目投资相关的市场信息,以降低投资产出的不确定性,但不应该对下属油藏经营管理区一味地强调风险规避;采油厂能够从油藏经营管理区的激烈竞争中获得"渔翁之利",有助于降低采油厂的代理成本;采油厂应该采取额外罚款、降职等其他手段。

Based on the principal-agent model of a single oil production plant and two reservoir management districts,we studied the impact of competitive relationship between reservoir management districts on the information value of investment and agency costs of oil production plant,the impact of possible collusive behavior between reservoir management districts and the preventive measures of oil production plant on investment incentives. The conclusions are as follows： firstly,in order to reduce the uncertainty of investment returns,oil production plants should try to collect market information about investment in oil projects instead of blindly requiring risk aversion of reservoir management districts;secondly,oil production plants can benefit from intense competition between reservoir management districts,and hence reduce the agency costs;thirdly,oil production plants should deter collusion behavior between reservoir management districts by means of additional fines or demotion,etc.