基于委托代理理论的高校科研经费管理问题研究

University Research Funds Management Based on Principal-agent Theory

高校科研经费管理活动中,项目委托单位、高校和项目负责人三方之间彼此构成了委托代理关系。本文使用博弈论中的委托代理理论作为分析工具,应用于科研经费管理的实际问题,分析了项目委托单位、高校和项目负责人各自追求的目标具体内容以及彼此掌握的信息。而他们彼此目标的不一致和信息的不对称正是导致科研经费使用过程中"道德风险"问题爆发的原因,这与委托代理理论的规律相符。并依据该理论从限制、激励和劝诫三个角度为高校科研经费管理提出具体解决建议。

Principal-agent relationship is constituted among project entrust organizations,universities and project leaders in the research fund management. Taking principal-agent theory as an analytical tool,and applying it to the practical research funding management problems,the goals pursued and information known by project entrust organizations,universities and project leaders respectively are analyzed. The three parts＇ inconsistent goals and asymmetric information obtained result in the ＂ moral hazard＂ problem in the use of research funding,which is consistent with the principal-agent theory. Based on the theory,suggestion on research funds management is proposed from the perspectives of restriction,incentive and dissuasion.