摘要
贝克莱主义是康德在其第一批判中主要的驳斥对象之一。然而,就两种学说的真实关系而言,某些研究者却有着不同的看法。文章认为,在某些方面康德的先验观念论固然与贝克莱的学说具有较强的一致性,但更重要的是对贝克莱主义的深层驳斥。与此相关,"物自身"的概念是否构成反驳贝克莱主义的一个有力手段,至今仍是一个悬而未决的难题。
Berkeleianism is one of the refute objects in Kantian first criticism. However, as for the re- al relation between the two theories, some scholars have different opinions. This article believes that although in some way Kantian theory of prior idea is consistent with Berkeleianism, it is more impor- tant that the former is a serious refute against the latter. Also, it is still suspense whether idea of "thing itself" forms a powerful means to refute Berkeleianism or not.
出处
《求是学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期32-38,共7页
Seeking Truth
基金
国家社科基金后期资助项目"康德<纯粹理性批判>中‘先验演绎’结构研究及其相关问题"
项目编号:13FZX010
关键词
先验唯心主义
先天感性形式
物自身
prior idealism, innate sensitivity form, thing itself