负债融资对公立医院固定资产过度投资影响实证研究——以B地区公立医院为例

Effect of Debt Financing on Over-investment of Public Hospitals: the Evidence from B Region

目的实证分析公立医院负债融资对固定资产过度投资的影响。方法结合公立医院所面临的制度背景,提出理论假设,并构建多元回归实证模型,以B地区公立医院的数据进行实证检验。结果银行借款和应付账款对过度投资有显著性影响,而预付账款没有影响。结论银行借款融资不能抑制公立医院的过度投资行为,反而是公立医院的过度投资行为重要诱因,尤其是对于大型三级公立医院来说,银行借款不仅直接为其过度投资提供资金来源,而且银行借款的杠杆收益还增加医院的自由现金流量,引发自由现金流量过度投资;应付账款能够有效抑制公立医院的过度投资行为;研究结果提示政府应当从打破公立医院垄断地位和加强公立医院商业银行借款监管两方面着手为债务治理效应创造良好环境。

Objective To theoretically analyze and empirically test the effect of debt financing on over-investment. Methods Giving the theoretical hypothesis and the empirical model, and studying the effect with the evidence from B region. Results Bank borrowings and payables accounts had significant effect on over-investment, but the effect of medical receipts in advance is of non-statistical meaning. Conclusion Bank borrowings can＇t inhibit but lead to over-investment. Payable accounts have a strong inhibitory effect on over-investment. The research result shows that government should break the monopoly position of public hospitals and enhance the supervision of commercial bank loan of public hospitals to create good environment for debt governance.