分析师关注与薪酬业绩敏感性:基于职业声誉和产权性质视角

Analyst Coverage and Compensation-Performance Sensitivity: Based on Perspectives of Professional Reputation and Nature of Property Right

文章以2002-2012年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验分析师关注对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现,分析师关注显著提高了薪酬业绩敏感性,在一定程度上发挥了外部监督作用。进一步研究表明,明星分析师关注对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响更为显著;相对于民营企业,分析师关注对国有企业薪酬业绩敏感性的影响程度更大。本文的研究为分析师关注对公司治理的影响研究提供了增量证据,同时对完善薪酬激励契约具有参考价值。

By taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2002 to 2012 as sample,this paper empirically tests the impact of the analyst coverage on the compensation-performance sensitivity. The results show that analyst coverage significantly increases compensation-performance sensitivity and plays an important role in external supervision to a certain extent. Further study suggests that famous analyst coverage can impose a greater influence on compensation-performance sensitivity,and the influence of analyst coverage on compensation-performance sensitivity in state-owned companies can be greater than that in private companies. This research can offer incremental evidence to the research of the impact of analyst coverage on corporate governance and provide valuable reference for the improvement of compensation-incentive contract.