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地方政府COD总量减排途径及行为研究 被引量:3

Research of the Methods and Behaviors in the Process of Local Governments' COD Total Emission Control
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摘要 "十一五"期间,各省份地方政府减排COD的主要途径有:建设污水处理厂、工业治理和结构关停,而各地对这三种途径的偏好以及相应的减排绩效大不相同。采用基于主成分分析的多元回归分析方法,分析了不同因素对于地方政府COD减排措施的影响(正相关、负相关还是不相关),发现各省份的COD排放背景(生活COD和工业COD的排放比例和排放强度)与地方政府能力(财政能力和环境监管能力)对减排措施有直接影响,显示了地方政府理性行为选择对减排潜力高的领域和减排效率高的途径有明显偏好,而地方经济结构则对COD减排没有影响。在此基础上进一步讨论了当前中国环境治理的地方分权模式,通过COD减排证明地方政府更为关注政治利益而非经济利益,针对地方政府的政绩考核在环保领域同样适用,但是现阶段地方政府在减排上存在路径偏好,在一定程度上偏离了政策初衷。 In the 11 th Five-Year-Plan period,there were three main methods for provincial governments to reduce the total emission of COD,which were water-treatment plant construction,industrial treatment and outdated capacity reduction.Each provincial government had its own preferences of the three methods,and the control performances were different from each other.Based on the principal component analysis and multiple regression,this article examined possible influence factors of the method preferences and performances.The result showed that the emission background characterized by the emission intensity and the ratio of domestic and industrial COD,and the fiscal and environmental regulation capacity could affect the provincial governments directly.The provincial governments had rational and obvious preference for the high-potential COD reduction methods.The local industry structure had no effect on COD reduction methods.On the basis of empirical analysis,this article discussed the decentralized environmental governance model of Chinese government system.It was proved that the local governments preferred political interest to economic interest.The promotion evaluation also played important roles in environment protection.But local governments' method preference in total emission control deviated from the original policy goals.
出处 《中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第4期1-10,138,共10页 Journal of China University of Geosciences(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 环境保护部环境规划院技术咨询项目(2011A047)
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