风电并网过程中的非合作博弈分析

Non-cooperation Game Analysis of Wind Power Integration

针对当前风电并网困难问题,综合考虑常规能源发电企业、风电企业、电网企业与政府之间的相互关系,根据非合作博弈理论进行分析,结果证明:风电并网困难问题的解决归根结底取决于风电发展规模的大小;政府对电网企业允许或不允许风电并网的行为进行补贴或处罚,取决于"弃风"量的大小和电网改造升级的成本高低,并且无论补贴或是处罚对社会福利的影响都是等效的;当"弃风"量达到一定程度时,电网企业对电网的改造升级将由被动转为主动。

In view of existing problems in the grid-connected wind power,this paper makes an analysis on the difficult problems of the wind power integration using non-cooperative game theory,considering the mutual relations between the conventional energy power enterprises,wind power enterprises,power grid enterprises,and the govern-ment. The result shows that the solution depends on the size of wind power development,the government＇s subsidies or punishment toward the action whether power grid enterprises permit the grid-connection of wind power or not,de-pending on the amount of abandoned wind and the cost of upgrading power grids,the impacts of subsidies or punish-ment on social welfare are equivalent. When the amount of abandoned wind reaches a certain level,power grid enter-prises will turn active from being passive to upgrade their power grids.