财政分权、地方政府竞争与省级出口增长

Fiscal Decentralization,Local Government Competition and Export Growth in the Provincial Level

我国整体出口奇迹的背后是省级层面的区域出口增长。本文分别阐述财政分权和地方政府竞争这两个制度因素促进我国各省出口增长的理论逻辑,并分别采用2002-2012年、1994-2012年我国29个省份的面板数据验证了这两个制度因素的促进作用。实证结果表明,以分税制为代表的财政分权作为经济激励因素,以晋升锦标赛为特征的地方政府竞争作为政治激励因素,两者都直接促进了我国省级出口增长。这一作用没有因为我国在2001年加入WTO而发生改变。由于两者的内在联动,财政分权还通过地方政府竞争间接促进了省级出口增长,这些结论在分别采用支出法和收入法衡量财政分权变量时均稳健成立。

The miracle of Chinese export growth is supported by the regional export growth in the provincial level. This paper elaborates the theoretical logic that fiscal decentralization and local government competition promote the export growth of Chinese provinces. This paper also uses the panel data of Chinese 29 provinces from 2002 to 2012 and from 1994 to 2012 to identify the promotion effect of these two institutional factors. The empirical results state that, fiscal decentralization as the economic incentive factor which is represented by the system of tax sharing, and local government competition as the political incentive factor which is featured as promotion tournament, both significantly improve Chinese export growth directly in the provincial level. This effect does not change with the China＇s entry of WTO in 2001. Because of the internal relation between these two factors, fiscal decentralization improves the export growth in the provincial level indirectly via local government competition. These results are robust when using the expenditure approach and the income approach to measure the variable of fiscal decentralization.