多种所有制经济竞争、策略外部性与政府规制机制

Mixed Competition,Strategic Externality and Regulatory Mechanism

本文结合我国基本经济制度,构建了涵盖政府、国有企业、民营企业三方参与的多阶段动态博弈模型。均衡分析与数值模拟表明,博弈的"策略外部性"使得多种所有制经济竞争制度与民营经济竞争制度、国有企业独家垄断经营制度呈现明显的区别,策略外部性从根本上扭曲了市场的资源配置方式,经典国有企业最大化社会福利这一"事前"策略将与"事后"的全局最优结果发生偏离;政府最优规制机制既不等价于要求国有企业最大化社会总剩余,也不等价于要求国有企业完全模仿民营企业,而是要结合企业效率、国有企业的剩余损失和内部化策略外部性带来的收益之间的权衡等因素进行设计,同时明确规制机制的内容并承诺其稳定性,对规制自身的有效性及市场平稳发展至关重要。本文为我国未来规制制度设计、垄断行业市场化改革、竞争政策倡导等提供了一定的理论依据。

This paper constructs a multi-stage game model including three kinds of agents like government, state-owned enterprise （SOE） and private enterprise. The equilibrium analysis and numeral simulation results show that strategic externality resulted from the game behaviors makes mixed competition system very different from the private enterprise competition system or the monopolistically SOE system. The strategic externality has fundamentally distorted the resource allocation pattern in the market. The ex-strategy for SOE to maximize the social welfare will be unrealizable, which will deviate from the post result of social optimality. The optimal regulatory mechanism is neither equal to the traditional mechanism which requires SOE to maximize social welfare, nor the mechanism to make SOE acting like private counterparts. Its design should consider the enterprise＇s cost efficiency and the trade-off between SOE＇s surplus and gain from internalizing strategic externality. The social regulator needs to clarify and commit the regulatory mechanism which is very important for the regulation＇s effectiveness and market stability. These conclusions are important for regulatory mechanism design on mixed economy, monopoly industry reform and competition policy initiative.