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企业迎合行为与政府补贴绩效研究——基于企业不同盈利状况的分析 被引量:171

Research on the Catering Behavior of Enterprise and Government Subsidy Performance——Based on the Analysis of the Enterprise's Profitability
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摘要 本文利用中国上市公司2008—2013年相关数据,研究了不同盈利状况下的企业为争取政府补贴会采取何种行为及这些行为的经济后果,从地方政府晋升压力角度对企业行为进行了深层次研究。研究发现:企业为争取政府补贴会采取迎合行为,且这种迎合行为不利于政府补贴绩效的发挥。具体而言,盈利状况较差的企业倾向于通过负向盈余操纵的方式获得政府补贴,这种行为弱化了补贴的企业绩效和社会绩效:而盈利状况较好的企业倾向于通过寻租的方式获得政府补贴,这种行为同样弱化了补贴的企业绩效,但由于地方政府与企业之间的双向寻租活动,使得该行为强化了补贴的社会绩效。进一步研究发现,只有在地方政府晋升压力较大的地区,企业的这种迎合行为才能发挥作用。实证研究表明,地方政府之间的"晋升锦标赛"及其对政府补贴的自由裁量权使得政府补贴容易成为地方政府服务于自身绩效考核和政治晋升的工具,最终导致政府补贴的浪费与错配。 Making use of data from Chinese listed companies during 2008 to 2013, this paper investigates what kind of behavior will be taken by enterprises to cater to local government in order to obtain more government subsidies and the economic consequences of this behavior based difference profitability of enterprises.Further, we carry out in-depth research from the perspective of promotion pressure of local government to corporate behaviors. The empirical study find that: enterprises will be taken to cater to the government in order to obtain government subsidies. Such behavior is certainly conducive to more government subsidies, but this behavior cannot play a role for the performance of government subsidies. Specifically, the corporate of poor performance tend to obtain government subsidies through negative earnings manipulation, and such behavior weakened the enterprise performance and social performance of subsidies. And the corporate of better performance tend to obtain government subsidies through rent-seeking, and such behavior weakened the enterprise performance of subsidies, but improved social performance of subsidies. Further study find that the behavior of catering can play a role only in the area that promotion pressure is greater. Empirical studies show that government subsidies likely to be a tools that help local government to achieve political promotion for local governments' political championships and subsidies discretion. Finally, that can result in wasting and misallocation of resources.
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第7期130-145,共16页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目"利益相关者集体选择视角的企业价值管理研究"(批准号71172099) 国家自然科学基金面上项目"媒体报道 媒体偏误与财务丑闻治理"(批准号71372168) 国家自然科学基金面上项目"利益相关者视角的营运资金管理研究与中国上市公司营运资金管理数据平台建设"(批准号71372111)
关键词 盈余操纵 寻租 政府补贴 企业绩效 社会绩效 earnings manipulation rent -seeking government subsidies enterprise performance social performance
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