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县级基本公共服务供给与财政分权体制的关系研究——以江西省为例 被引量:11

On the Relationship between Fiscal Decentralization System and Basic Public Services Supply at County-Level: A Case Study of Jiangxi Province
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摘要 利用江西省近19年省级统计数据和近7年的县级统计数据,实证分析了财政分权体制对县级基本公共服务供给的影响。研究发现,中国式财政分权在缺少"用手投票"和"用脚投票"机制的情况下,不仅没有为地方基本公共服务的供给创造有利条件,反而成为了制约其合理增长、均衡发展的体制性因素。为此,要改善基本公共服务供给,需要转变政府职能、淡化GDP考核、加强财政监督、探索多元化供给等措施,并依此发挥财政分权体制在促进基本公共服务均衡供给中的保障作用。 By making use of the statistical data of Jiangxi province in recent 19 years and the statistical data at county-level in recent 7 years, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the ef- fects of fiscal decentralization system on the basic public services supply at county-level. It is found that under the conditions of lacking the so called "voting by hand" and "voting by foot" , the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization cannot create favorable conditions for the supply of basic public services by local governments, on the contrary, it has become an institutional factor hindering its reasonable growth and balanced development. Therefore, it is required to take such measures as improving the supply of the basic public services, transforming the govemment's role, weakening the GDP assessment, emphasizing financial supervision, exploring multiple supplies and so on, so as to give full play to the protection role of the fiscal decentralization system in promoting the equilibrium sup- ply of the basic public services.
作者 匡小平 赵丹
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第7期24-34,共11页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"地方政府债务现状 问题与防控机制研究:以江西为例"(71163012) 江西省研究生创新专项资金项目"江西省县级基本公共服务与财政分权体制的关系研究"
关键词 财政分权体制 县级基本公共服务 政绩考核 转移支付 fiscal decentralization system basic public services at county-level government performance appraisal transfer payment
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