洪水保险的策略性定价

Strategic Pricing on Flood Insurance

从激励减灾的角度,运用契约设计理论,探讨了洪水保险契约设计问题,并得出:当保险人是风险规避类型的时候,即使是完全信息下的洪水保险契约也不能为投保人提供完全的保险,而在存在道德风险的情形进行垄断定价时,代理人获得的保险程度进一步被扭曲。保险公司进行策略性定价时,投保人是否采取减灾努力主要与洪灾发生率有关。而若要达到社会最优的减灾不被扭曲,保险公司的价格必需受到管制。

From the angle of reducing disaster, with the theory of contract design, to discuss the contract design of flood insurance. It is found out： when the insurer is the type of risk aversion, even in the complete information condition, the flood insurance contract cannot provide complete insurance to the insurer. When there are moral risk and monopoly pricing, the insurance degree will be further distorted. On strategic pricing, the disaster reducing efforts of the insurer are concerned with disaster rate. For reaching the non-distortion of social optimal disaster reduction, the price by insurance company should be restricted.