资本约束、杠杆率新规与监管效果:来自中国上市银行的证据

Capital Constraint,the New Regulations on Leverage Ratio and Supervision Effects:Evidence from Chinese Listed Banks

自巴塞尔协议Ⅲ公布并在中国实施以来,资本约束和杠杆率新规监管实施效果究竟如何,已成为中国银行业监管理论和实践值得关注的问题。本文采用联立方程模型,对中国上市银行执行和实施资本约束及杠杆率新规进行了实证检验和分析,结果表明:无论是资本充足率还是杠杆率指标,都基本实现了有效降低中国上市银行资产风险水平的监管效果,但是,这两个监管工具实施对银行绩效的影响存在差异。研究进一步发现,两个监管工具的实施,在样本期间并没有对中国上市银行形成显著监管压力。

Since the promulgation and implementation of Basel AccordⅢ in China,the supervision effects of capital constraint and the new regulations on leverage ratio have become the problems to which the theory and practice of Chinese banking supervision pays attention. This paper empirically tests and analyzes the execution and implementation of capital constraint and the new regulations on leverage ratio by Chinese listed banks by using simultaneous equation models. The result indicates: both the capital adequacy ratio and leverage ratio have basically realized the supervision effects of efficiently reducing the asset risk level of Chinese listed banks. But the effects of implementing the two supervision tools on banks' performance are different. The research finds: the implementation of the two supervision tools did not form significant supervision pressure on Chinese listed banks in the sample period.