反思存款保险制度中的道德风险问题

Reflections on the Moral Hazard of Deposit Insurance System

存款保险制度与道德风险的关系,是无法回避的问题。然而将降低道德风险作为建立存款保险制度的目的之一,却有可能产生偏差,造成本末倒置。降低道德风险是存款保险制度建立时应考虑的因素,但是存款保险制度的基本目标,应当定位为防止银行挤兑。通过确保满足存款保险制度成功的先决条件,以及合理设计存款保险制度本身的规则,将存款保险制度所带来的道德风险的增量,控制在一个可接受的范围内,实现维护金融稳定的目标。

The relationship between deposit insurance and moral hazard is an unavoidable problem. However, it will be wrongful to treat the reduction of moral hazard as one of the purposes of deposit insurance system. Although, due consideration should be given to reduce moral hazard, but the basic goal of the deposit insurance system, should be positioned to prevent banking runs. Through the following measures, deposit insurance system would play a role in maintaining financial stability： ensuring that the deposit insurance system should meet the prerequisites, the reasonable design of the deposit insurance system itself, and putting restrictions on incremental amount of moral risk caused by the deposit insurance system.