高管薪酬差距、控股股东与民营上市公司绩效关系实证分析

The Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Executive Pay Gap,Controlling Shareholder and Corporate Performance of Private Listed Company

基于公司高管及控股股东在公司决策中的重要作用,笔者通过手工收集数据,以2012—2013年民营上市公司为例,以行为理论、锦标赛理论以及堑壕防御理论为基础,并以民营企业控股股东为调节变量,分析了民营企业高管薪酬差距的影响因素及其与公司业绩之间的关系。实证结果表明,相对于公司特征,公司的治理结构特征会对高管薪酬的差距产生显著影响;而高管薪酬差距则对公司业绩有显著的正向影响;但是具有较高实际控制权的控股股东会抑制高管薪酬差距激励作用的有效发挥。笔者的研究结果为民营企业高管薪酬的设计提供了新的研究思路,同时也为高管薪酬差距影响因素及其经济后果的分析提供了经验证据。

Based on the behavioral theory, tournament theory and the entrenchment effect, through manual data collection, this paper analyzes the influence factors of private listed company executive pay gap and the relationship between executive pay gap and the company＇s performance, on the basis of the moderator of controlling shareholder, the important function of the company executives and the controlling shareholder in the company decision, according to the private listed company data of 2012 and 2013. The empirical results show that relative to the company features, the company＇s governance structure features will have a significant impact on executive pay gap. And executive pay gap can have a significant formance. But the controlling shareholders with high actual control of itive impact on the company＇s percompany may restrain the useful effect of the executive pay gap. The results provide a new research idea for the design of executive compensa- tion for the private enterprise. Meanwhile the research and economic consequences of executive pay gap. provides the empirical evidence for the effect factors and economic consequences of executive pay gap.