摘要
城市群创新主体交流沟通是其产生协同意愿的充分条件,会影响协同稳定性和系统演化结果。构建了城市群创新主体协同交流博弈模型,分析了创新主体交流动因,并用间接演化方法探讨了其协同稳定性问题,认为创新利润是直接的协同动因,同质和异质性创新主体协同会影响协同意愿,且其规模差异及条件等因素综合影响演化路径。最后对城市群创新主体协同保障机制进行了分析,并提出了相应的对策建议。
Communication among the innovators of the urban agglomeration is a sufficient condition for the synergy inten- tion,it would affect the synergy stability and the result of system evolution. Structures a synergy communication game model between innovators, analyzes their communicate agent, discusses the synergistic stability using the indirect evolu- tion. The conclusion is that the innovation profit would be the direct synergy motivation,the homogeneous and heterogene- ous innovators would affect the synergy willingness,and the main scale difference, condition and others affect the evolution path comprehensively. At last analyzes the synergy mechanism of the innovator and puts out the corresponding policy sug- gestion. K
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第14期47-50,共4页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(11BJY022)
武汉理工大学华夏学院基金项目(15026)
关键词
交流演化
城市群创新主体
协同博弈
Communication Evolution
Innovator of Urban Agglomeration
Synergy Game