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政治关联对铁路债务融资能力影响及风险管控对策 被引量:2

The Effect of Political-connection on the Railway Debt Financing Capacity and the Risk Control Measures
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摘要 政治关联是连接企业内部治理与其所处制度环境的纽带之一。铁路债务融资能力和融资风险与其行业性质及政府管控密切相关。我国铁路债务风险在高度集权垄断的管理体制下容易演变为行业系统性的债务危机。实现政企分开是从制度层面完成对铁路风险管控的第一步,其次是规范铁路政治关联机制。具体的风险管控措施包括:规范铁路政治关联的机制,充分考虑铁路债务既有情况、渐进式的制度改革逻辑以及铁路客观经济技术属性,调整政府与铁路的关系,使其制度框架趋向合理化,促进铁路这一经济主体在市场经济体制中能够正常运转。 Political association is one of the connecting links between internal governance and the institutional environment. Ability of railway debt financing and financing risk are closely related to the nature of the industry and government regulation. Under the managing system of high centralization and monopoly, the debt risk of China's railway can easily evolve into the systematic debt risk of the industry. By analyzing and measuring the influence of political connection acting on the ability of railway debt financing, we find that political associated railway has the strong ability to finance. However, the risk of debt financing is enormous, and along the railway debt risk chain it can easily influence the government and financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies, thus forming a debt crisis. Some debt risk control measures and suggestions are proposed after systematic analysis of the railway debt problems forming logic and the principle of risk conduction under the perspective of political connection.
出处 《理论学刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第7期39-48,共10页 Theory Journal
关键词 政治关联 铁路债务融资 能力 风险 治理管控 political-connection railway debt financing ability risk control
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