现金股利承诺对控股股东掏空行为的影响——基于委托代理视角的分析

Does Cash Dividend Commitment Constrain Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling Behaviors?:Based on Agency View

中国资本市场存在的一个重要问题是控股股东侵占中小股东利益的现象非常普遍。2011年,证监会实行了新股发行股利强制披露制度,希望通过提高上市公司的分红水平,约束企业的现金流使用,一定程度上抑制控股股东掏空上市公司的行为。那么,这一政策的实际效果如何?本文研究结论发现:(1)相比承诺低分红比例的公司,承诺高分红比例的公司更加倾向运用应计项目盈余管理和真实盈余管理的手段调低当期利润,从而降低分红基数;(2)相比承诺低分红比例的公司,承诺高分红比例的公司更加倾向通过过度购买母公司产品向母公司转移利润。本文的研究结论表明企业的机会主义行为一定程度上削弱了现金股利承诺制度的监管效果。

Tunneling behaviors are quite pervasive in China. In 2011, China＇ s Securities Reg- ulatory Commission （CSRC） requires IPO firms to make commitment on future dividend policy in firm articles. CSRC hopes that this policy can constrain free cash flows, therefore discipline tunne- ling behaviors. Does this policy work？ We find that firms that make high dividend payment ratio are more likely to manage earnings downwards by discretional accruals and real earnings management. We also find that firms that make high dividend payment ratio are more likely to transfer profits back to parental firms. Our findings suggest that firms＇ responds to CSRC＇ s new policy decrease policy effectiveness.