摘要
学术界主流观点认为庄子是不可知论者,但对此的论证所依据的材料只是整个《庄子》的一部分,《庄子》中的很多其他材料都表明庄子是可知论者。通过仔细分析所有那些作为庄子哲学是不可知论的证据,发现对这些材料可以有完全不同的然而更为可信的解释,在新的解释下这些材料并不表明庄子哲学是不可知论。因此,庄子的认识论是可知论是唯一的且与所有的材料一致的合理的结论。通过分析《庄子》中对知与不知的关系的相关论述,指出《庄子》中貌似矛盾的陈述其实都有合理的解释。《庄子》所作的"知之所不知"与"知之所知"(隐性知识与显性知识)的区分,可以解决《庄子》中一方面主张"道不可言",另一方面有大量的对道的言说等悖论。
According to the popular view, Zhuangzi was an agnostic. But the evidence for this view is only a part of the whole book Zhuangzi. Other materials in Zhuangzi show that Zhuangzi holds that the world is knowable. By anatomizing all the evidences which was regarded as supporting that Zhuangzi was an agnostic, we find that these evidences can have a totally different yet more believable explanation. According to the new explanation, the philosophy of Zhuangzi is not agnosticism. And this is consistent with all the materials in Zhuangzi and thus the only reasonable conclusion. There are a lot of seemingly paradoxical statements in Zhuangzi. If we pay enough attention to the division of 'the known of the knowing'( explicit knowledge) from 'the unknown of the knowing'( tacit knowledge) which is made by Zhuangzi, then we can solve the paradoxes such as, on the one hand Zhuangzi said that 'Tao can't be told', on the other hand he told a lot about Tao.
出处
《淮阴师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2015年第4期457-481,559,共25页
Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
庄子
认识论
不可知论
怀疑论
悖论
Zhuangzi
epistemology
agnosticism
skepticism
paradox