摘要
1948年,卫立煌准备与中共东北野战军长期对峙。他以国民党军主力固守沈阳,致使东北野战军在长达6个月的时间内无战机可觅。虽然卫立煌对毛泽东和林彪攻打锦州的意图判断失误,反对动用沈阳主力增援,却一直设法保存锦州国民党军实力。卫立煌力主西进兵团回师沈阳,正是林彪在辽西会战中最担心的后果。相对于蒋介石,卫立煌是中共最有分量的对手。有关其所作所为有利于中共的言论是错误的,有关其应为国民党军战败承担最大责任的观点也是错误的,前者贬低了中共的决策能力,后者遮掩了蒋介石的过失。
In 1948, Wei LiHuang prepared a long-term confrontation with the Northeast PLA. He held fast to Shenyang with the main force, and therfore, the Northeast PLA had no chance to attack during 6 months. Although he made a wrong judgment on Mao and Lin' s intention of attacking Jinzhou, he opposed the reinforcement using Shenyang main force, trying to preserve the military strength of Jinzhou. He urged the West Corps to go back to Shenyang, which was Lin Biao most worried about in Western Liaoning battle. Relative to Chiang Kai-shek, Wei Lihuang was the most challenging component of the CPC. The opinion that his actions were beneficial to the CPC were wrong, and the opinion that he should bear the responsibility for the military defeat of KMT army was wrong. The former belittled the the decision-making ability of the CPC, and the latter covered Chiang Kai-shek' s fault.
出处
《中共党史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第7期80-86,共7页
CPC History Studies