家族企业管理者是否存在学习行为——基于定向增发的经验数据

Do Managers in Family Firms Learn from the Market——Evidence Data Based on Private Placement

基于2006~2013年上市公司的定向增发数据,对管理者最终决策与市场反应间的关系进行了研究,验证了学习行为的存在性。总体来说,家族参与管理可以弱化管理者的学习行为,尤其当家族以金字塔结构实现对公司的绝对控制时,管理者更容易忽视市场的反馈信息。当家族控制权与所有权分离较大时,家族成员参与认购增发股份以及家族成员担任高管,都会降低管理者向市场学习的概率。独立董事制度在家族企业定向增发中,并未起到应有的监督作用。

Using private placement 2006-2013 data of listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, we examine the existence of managers＇ learning from the market. The results show that family member＇participation in management can reduce the probability of managers＇ learning, especially when the families control firms with pyramid structure. When the separation of ownership and control rights is large, when family members participate in purchasing the new shares and when family members serve as managers, the managers are less likely to learn from the market. The independent directors don＇t play their dual role in monitoring managers.