现实机理、适度竞争与农村金融监管

Real Mechanism, Moderate Competition and Rural Financial Supervision

基于"人本"与弥合市场机制缺陷的诉求,我国农村金融呈现自发的规制内生属性。而政府规制并非总是行之有效:金融"权势"企业通过利率垄断实现政府俘获;弱势"俘获企业"通过趋同政府投资偏好发起"逆向"俘获;"行政行贿企业"以削减政府道德风险规制成本为名达成"意愿"俘获。农村金融政府规制面临相机抉择,选择市场化自由则可能陷入"新古典悖论",强调政府对市场的功能型补缺则难以回避政府俘获的窘境。进行俘获矫正与规制约束,应确立"法治化自由"的规制理念,以市场化的适度竞争机制消除金融垄断,并通过深化金融财政体制改革以防控"隧道行为"。

Based on ＂humanism＂ and the demands for making up for the failure of market mechanism, China＇s rural finance has taken on the characteristics of regulation- endogenous. But the government regulation is not always effective： regulatory authorities may be captured by interest groups. Free market or state-regulated market, which is the optimal choice？ To correct capture behaviors and set constraints to regulation, the relevant departments should establish the vision of freedom-under-law, and moderate the competition mechanism to eliminate financial monopolies, what＇s more, through deepening the reform of the financial system to control the ＂tunnel＂ activities.