机构投资者治理作用与公司过度投资——基于内生性视角的重新审视

Institutional investors'governance effects on corporate overinvestment:A review based on endogeneity

选择2011—2012年两市A股有过度投资行为的上市公司作为样本,从内生性视角重新审视了机构投资者对公司治理的作用。首先采用普通最小二乘法证实了机构持股与公司过度投资程度有相互影响的内生性问题,而进一步的二阶段最小二乘法发现:机构投资者会显著加剧公司过度投资水平,反过来公司过度投资水平较低的情况又会显著吸引机构投资者入驻,说明我国机构投资者对公司治理的影响具有双重性,在"用手投票"破坏公司治理的同时"用脚投票"改善公司治理。研究结果要求政策具有双重针对性,从而使机构投资者对公司治理的影响能够扬长避短。

With the datum of Chinese A-share listed companies which implemented overinvestment in the year of 2011 and 2012as the research sample,this paper tests the effect of institutional investors on corporate governance from the perspective of endogeneity.The endogenous interrelationship between the institutional investors＇shareholding ratio and corporate overinvestment scale was confirmed through the OLS.Further test by TSLS reveals that the participation of institutional investors in corporate governance significantly aggravates the extent of overinvesting while conversely the relatively low level of overinvestment significantly attracts institutional investors.The results suggest that the effect of institutional investors＇behavior on corporate governance is double,which means that institutional investors undermine the corporate governance efficiency by＂voting with hands＂and improve the corporate governance efficiency by＂voting with feet＂.The conclusion requires that policies be made according with institutional investors＇influences on corporate governance and make best use of their advantages.