摘要
结合煤炭产业整合过程中参与主体特点的分析,通过构建以中央政府、地方政府为主体的博弈模型进行均衡分析,研究中央政府政策优惠在地方政府执行政策中的必要性及其具体确定原则。研究结果表明,只有通过中央政府的介入及补贴使地方政府进行煤炭产业整合的成本消耗得到补偿,地方政府才会选择与煤炭产业可持续发展相容的行为。
Based on the characteristics of main participators in the process of coal industry resources integration, this re- search made a balanced analysis by building gamemodel of the central government, local government as the main partici- pators in order to explore the necessity and specific principles in implementing central government preferential policies for local governments. The results show that only through intervention and subsidies by central government to compensate the cost of consumption of coal industry could local governments enableto choose the sustainable development for the coal in- dustry.
出处
《山西农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
2015年第9期928-931,共4页
Journal of Shanxi Agricultural University:Social Science Edition
关键词
煤炭产业整合
利益
博弈
Coal industry integration
Interest
Game