海洋灾害保险市场道德风险防范策略研究

Strategy of moral hazard controlling in marine disaster insurance market

在海洋灾害保险市场中,高风险投保人容易利用信息不对称,伪装成低风险投保人参与到投保活动中。这种道德风险降低保险公司承保和低风险者支付的意愿,制约海洋灾害保险市场运行。通过引入信号传递机制,明确给出海洋灾害保险各局中人行为策略,并求解灾害保险参与人得益函数,解析其子博弈精炼贝叶斯均衡的实现路径,获得有效控制道德风险的海洋灾害保险定价约束条件,并基于此提出相应的对策建议。

In disaster insurance market, which is similar with policy-oriented agricultural insurance, high-risk appli- cants tend to disguise as low-risk ones, taking advantage of information asymmetry. Moral hazard decreases insurers＇ underwriting willingness and insurants＇payment willingness, which condition the efficiency of disaster insurance mar- ket. The paper provided the behavioral strategys in disaster insurance market according to signal transmission mecha- nism and solved the profit functions. By analyzing the sub-game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the author offered pricing constraints for disaster insurance under moral risk and the corresponding suggestions.