摘要
为了研究无信号交叉口冲突车辆间驾驶员的决策行为,从博弈角度出发,根据影响驾驶员决策行为的性格因素,以及不同策略之间相对的势因素,通过时间细化,建立基于重复博弈下影响驾驶员决策行为的效用函数。通过驾驶员在交叉行进过程中的决策行为,分析不同驾驶员决策行为组合的效用,确定博弈过程中存在Nash均衡,得到动态博弈中驾驶员的最优决策。例证表明:冲动型的驾驶员在各决策时间段内更愿意选择加速抢先策略;温和型的驾驶员在各决策时间段内偏好于加速抢先策略或保持匀速策略;谨慎型的驾驶员在各决策时间段内偏好于选择保持匀速策略或减速礼让策略。
In order to study the driver＇s decision-making behaviors of the conflict vehicles in non-signalized intersection,according to the driver＇s personality factors and the relative potential factors in the different strategies which affect the driver to make decisions,as well as the time refinement,the utility function of the driver＇s behaviors based on the dynamic reduplicate game theory was built up from the view of game theory.As the decision-making behavior by the driver in the process of cross-road,analyzing the different combination of the utility of the driver＇s decision-making behavior,Nash equilibrium was existed in a single game process,and the driver＇s optimal decision behaviors in a dynamic game was obtained.The illustration shows that impulse drivers in the decision-making period of time are more willing to choose to accelerate the first strategy; mild drivers prefer to choose accelerate the preemptive strategy or maintain uniform strategy; cautious drivers prefer to choose to maintain uniform strategy or deceleration comity strategy.
出处
《重庆交通大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2015年第3期105-111,共7页
Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(51368046
71161005)
江西省教育厅科学技术研究项目(GJJ11518)
关键词
交通工程
无信号交叉口
重复博弈
交通冲突
NASH均衡
traffic engineering
non-signalized intersection
reduplicate game
traffic conflict
Nash equilibrium
