论休谟对人为之德与自然之德的区分

On Hume's Distinction between Artificial Virtues and Natural Virtues

休谟对自然之德和人为之德的区分,实际上是一个统一的道德心理进程的不同阶段:首先,这两类德性都处于同一个道德感的框架内,具有基本相同的逻辑结构;其次,在正义之德这一最典型的人为之德的形成与确认过程中,"人为的"和"自然的"因素其实是共同作用,相互交织的;最后,这两类德既能够相互区别,又能够相互生成与融合,其关键在于同情原则及其在不同阶段上的作用方式。

Hume＇s distinction between artificial virtues and natural virtues has long become a problem of much controversy,which is taken by many scholars as a＂classification＂without much intrinsic connection.This thesis argues that this distinction is,in the first place,one between different stages of a unified progress of moral psychology.Firstly,both artificial virtues and natural virtues belong to a common framework of moral sense,sharing its basic logical structure,secondly,both ＂artificial＂and＂natural＂factors works interactively to form and identify justice,the most typical artificial virtue and finally,the principle of sympathy and its functioning patterns in different stages explains how they can integrate into as well as distinguish from each other.