商业银行高管薪酬改革问题研究

The Salary Reform of Commercial Bank Executives

高管薪酬激励约束机制是现代企业公司治理中极其重要的内容,对高管的有效激励有助于提高企业的经营绩效。选取我国16家上市商业银行2008年至2013年的数据,建立面板数据模型,对我国商业银行高管薪酬与银行风险之间的相关性进行实证分析,结果发现,银行高管薪酬与衡量银行风险的不良贷款率之间呈正相关关系,我国银行业对高管可能存在过度激励的现象。推行高管薪酬体制改革,建立完善的高管考核指标体系,形成有效的激励约束机制,加强风险管理,对商业银行的持续稳定发展至关重要。

Executive salary incentive mechanism is a very important part of the modern enterprise management. And effective incentive for executives is helpful to improve the performance of business.This paper selects the data of the 16 listed banks from the year 2008 to 2013, and establishes the panel data model to make an empirical analysis on the relation between executive salary and the risk of commercial banks in China. The research finds out that there is a positive correlation between executive salary and non-performing loan ratio, that is used to measure the risk of the bank, viz. the possible excessive incentives for executives in China＇s banking industry. Therefore, it is critical for commercial bank＇s sustainable and stable development to introduce reform of the executive compensation system,establish the scientific performance inspection system and effective incentive mechanism, and strengthen the risk management.