哲学直觉及其在实验哲学中的作用

Philosophical Intuition and Its Roles in Experimental Philosophy

为了避免许多关于"什么是哲学直觉"的无谓争论,我们应当把哲学直觉限定在实验哲学的范围内。在此范围之内,哲学直觉就是大众对包含哲学问题的调查问卷的直觉反应。关于哲学直觉能否扮演证据角色,威廉姆森和亚历山大有过争论。前者认为证据最好是事实而不是直觉,后者认为没有直觉很多事实便建立不起来。对这场争论的进一步审视,将我们引向了哲学直觉在实验哲学中扮演的三种角色。应该说,大规模地诉诸大众的哲学直觉正是实验哲学的方法论基础。

This paper argues that,in order to avoid getting into a meaningless debate about＂what is philosophical intuition＂,we should first of all confine the concept of philosophical intuition（ PI） to the discussion of experimental philosophy only,where PI refers to intuitive responses of respondents to questionnaires related to philosophy. Timothy Williamson and Joshua Alexander have debated whether PI can take an evidential role. While Williamson claims that the best evidence should be nothing but facts,Alexander points out that without intuition many facts cannot be established at all. Further scrutiny of their debate enables us to realize that there are in fact three roles that PI can play in experimental philosophy. It is argued that extensive recourse to PI constitutes the methodological foundation in experimental philosophy.