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财政分权体制下的城市环境污染问题研究——来自中国73个城市的经验数据 被引量:14

Study of Urban Environmental Pollution under Fiscal Decentralization System—Empirical Data from 73 Cities in China
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摘要 “中国式分权”带来经济发展奇迹的同时,也加剧了环境污染。文章以我国73个环境重点监测城市2003~2012年的数据作为研究样本,利用静态面板和动态面板模型,实证考察了城市层面的财政分权与环境污染的关系。结果表明,不论是财政收入分权还是支出分权的提高都会提高污染物的排放水平,前者通过“政企合谋”实现,后者则通过地方官员支出的偏向实现,且前者的影响更大,造成上述结果更重要的原因是官员考核机制的缺陷,制度改革势在必行。应该改变现行的地方官员考核评价机制,完善财政分权体制,处理好经济增长和环境污染的关系,通过产业结构的优化和升级等逐步提高环境质量。 “Chinese‐style separation of powers”not only brings miracle of economic development ,but also exac‐erbate environmental pollution .In this paper ,we conduct an empirical study of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution of urban dimension using China ’s 73 monitored environment cities from 2003 to 2012 data as the study sample ,and developing static panel and dynamic panel models .The results show that both the revenue and expenditure decentralization will improve the level of emissions of pollutants ;the former is due to“collusion”and the latter is due to local officials’ spending tendency ,and the former’s im‐pact is greater .The more important reason is the defect of officials’ assessment mechanisms ;its reform is nec‐essary .T herefore ,the existing local officials’ assessment mechanism should be changed ,fiscal decentralization be improved ,the relationship between economic growth and environmental pollution be well handled ,and envi‐ronmental quality be gradually improved through the optimization and promotion of industrial structure .
出处 《大连理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 2015年第3期34-39,共6页 Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)
基金 榆林市产学研合作项目:"资源地生态环境建设财税政策研究"(cxy12-2-09)
关键词 财政分权 环境污染 官员考评机制 fiscal decentralization environmental pollution official evaluation mechanism
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参考文献15

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