我国上市公司会计稳健性与股利分配的实证研究

Empirical Research on Accounting Conservatism and Dividend Distribution of Listed Companies in China

公司是各种契约的结合体,股利政策是大股东、少数股东、债权人及经理层等利益主体之间博弈的核心内容,笔者利用我国A股上市公司2008—2013年的数据,采用线性相关分析和多因素回归分析等方法研究了会计稳健性和股利分配之间的关系,研究表明会计稳健性与股利分配水平呈倒"U"型关系,一方面,会计稳健性作为缓解股东与经理层、大股东与少数股东之间代理问题的一种有效治理机制,通过及时地遏制非效率投资、降低融资约束,从而提高股利支付水平;另一方面,债权人通过稳健的会计信息提高上市公司股利发放的门槛,降低股利支付水平,最大限度地将股利留在公司,实现对自身利益的保护。笔者从会计稳健性的角度研究了公司的股利分配政策,深化了股利分配理论,丰富了会计稳健性经济后果论的相关研究。

The company is a combination of various contracts and the game among stakeholders, and dividend policy is the core content of the game between shareholders, creditors and managers and other stakeholders. Accounting conservatism as the main means and methods of a game between the stakeholders has important influence on dividend policy, This paper studies the relationship between accounting conservatism and dividend policy using the sample data of Chinese A-share listed companies in 2008-2013. The results show that accounting conservatism and dividend level present inverted ＂U＂ type relationship. In this paper, we study the dividend distribution policy from the perspective of accounting conservation, deepen the theory of dividend distribution, and enrich the relevant research on the economic consequences of accounting conserva- tion.